An Agitator thread about Norman Borlaug and this op-ed from the LA Times have both been simmering away at the back of my mind, melding with the first week’s readings, to help shape some of those thoughts.

The op-ed (by Charlotte Allen) blasts Ellen Ruppel Shell’s book Cheap (which, to be fair, I have not read, though I have read a number of the other authors discussed in the article), and much of the article is concerned with food; specifically, the fact that right now in North America, food is cheap and on average, households spend a much lower percentage of their income on their food (though that average is key). However, Allen caricatures her opponents (Alice Waters and Michael Pollan, for example). She notes that they feel that food is under-priced, and then accuses them of wanting others to impoverish themselves, but ignores the rather important question of why they feel food is “too cheap.” By doing so, Allen demolishes a strawman quite nicely, but she certainly hasn’t convinced me that Waters and Pollan – and, presumably, Shell – are a bunch of elitist snobs trying to stomp down the poor in the name of foodie culture.

Meanwhile, Radley Balko posted a bit of a tribute to the late Norman Borlaug, who was one of the innovators of the “green revolution”. For those who don’t know, the green revolution encompasses a number of new developments in agriculture, including synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, and hybrid high-yield crops. This is a significant challenge to the neo-Malthusian perspective; the green revolution makes it very clear that food production will not be inevitably outstripped by population growth.

The story of modern-day cheap food and the green revolution are deeply connected, and as is noted in the Agitator thread (by myself, among others), this is not an entirely bad thing. I’m an environmentalist, and I’m not an optimist of the Julian Simon school of thought; I do believe that the Earth is finite (although the limits are, to some extent, elastic), and I think that the human population will have to be limited in the long run, though I think the only way for that will work is if it’s voluntary. However, in the short run, whether or not we believe that the planet is over-populated, it is not right that people should starve if we can prevent it. And right now, we can, and industrial agriculture made that possible, both by increasing the food supply and lowering food prices. Garrett Hardin‘s lifeboat metaphor is one of the foulest ideas I’ve ever heard associated with environmentalism, and criticizing industrial agriculture for enabling population growth without widespread starvation skirts dangerously close to that way of thinking.

That said, industrial agriculture should not be immune to criticism. What Charlotte Allen – and Radley Balko – overlook is that although industrializing agriculture made food prices lower in part through economies of scale and greater productivity, it also created a number of negative externalities. Tegtmeier and Duffy (2004), for example, examined the costs of soil erosion, water and air pollution, biodiversity loss, and human health impacts from conventional agriculture, and suggested that in total, 5 – 16.9 billion dollars are spent annually in the US to pay for the consequences of industrial agriculture. Those numbers are large, but they might be a reasonable price to pay to prevent hunger. However, the problems for which Tegtmeier and Duffy are evaluating costs are not static; for example, erosion imposes an annual cost, but the annual cost will go up as arable land is reduced and soil fertility is lost. When I go to the grocery store and buy a pint of strawberries that were grown on a conventional farm on the other side of the continent, I do not pay those extra costs. Society – and the surrounding environment – does.

We will pay those costs eventually – unless we take a critical look at industrial agriculture. Critical assessment doesn’t mean that we deny that industrial agriculture has helped people; it means we work to assess the unintended consequences to both environmental and human health, and look for alternative practices that can stave off those consequences while retaining the advantages. And there’s my Julian Simon moment – I think that there is plenty of evidence that with enough political will, sustainable agricultural practices can be implemented, and they do not mean either a low-productivity agriculture that will not feed our population, or a return to individual subsistence agriculture. Criticizing industrial agriculture for its well-documented environmental and health consequences does not mean that one must necessarily take an abhorrent moral stance with regard to the human population and our well-being.

His point, that modernization leads to increased risks as a consequence of modern activity, and that those risks spur ever more attempts to fix the problems through technology, makes sense. One issue I take with Beck’s notion of “risk society” is that he attempts to argue that social problems and upheaval will result from “reflexive modernization”. I don’t find his case that there will be significant societal consequences arising from genetic engineering convincing, due to the lack of data discussed in my previous post on the books.

However, Beck’s belief that the lack of clear responsibility for any harm that may be caused by emitters of chemical and radioactive pollution will allow the world as a whole to become a laboratory for the potential environmental consequences seems to me to be more persuasive. As I understand him, though, Beck is arguing that the scientific, naturalistic worldview has become too powerful and too closely linked with capitalist interests. This means that no matter what problems are caused by the (presumably commercial) application of scientific research, science and industry will be able to profit by the damage they create and society as a whole will pay the price. Naomi Klein makes a very similar point in The Shock Doctrine, writing about the defense and security industries and the degree of political influence their leaders have gained. It is here that I think Beck is slightly off-base in his criticisms of the scientific worldview.

It seems to me that Beck is correct that the application of science has led to significant environmental damage, but I disagree that this is a new phenomenon, and the scientific method, unlike earlier explorations into new technology, as Beck himself argues, gives us the ability to examine our past harms and also to extrapolate our future. What we need is greater understanding of the scientific method among a much wider segment of the population, in order to effectively direct science. Beck criticizes the ultra-specialization of the practice of science and its elitist character, but as I understand him, he then argues that to prevent widespread social and environmental damage by these scientific elites, the practice of science itself should be socially limited without much regard for the actual evidence that certain directions for research are inherently risky.

That would limit potential harm, but it would also deprive us of many potential benefits. Of course, as I read Beck, he does not believe that scientific knowledge has led to social and individual benefits. I do accept that we benefit from science, in many ways beyond the wonder of understanding. I’d rather see that understanding expanded across the population, and have as many people as possible be capable of realistic evaluation of the risks posed by scientific research and its applications. Beck and I agree that science can cause problems, but I see the fact that science also contains the tools to fix problems as its great strength, not a reason for mistrust.

While Ecological Politics is much more accessible than Risk Society, I think it shows the same method of speculation about the social effects of technology without supporting information. In the first chapter, Beck explores the potential of reproductive technology to fundamentally alter the way humans are born. He is particularly concerned with the way that human embryos (may) become a sort of commodity for researchers, and the results of their research leads to greater and greater levels of medical and scientific intervention into the production of children, and presumably this feeds back into the need to do more genetic research in order to feed this new market.

It’s interesting speculation, but all that it is, is speculation. Beck says that in vitro fertilization is indicated more and more frequently (now that it is possible), but does not offer any statistical information on how many couples are using it (or why!), or how many men are depositing sperm at sperm banks, or how many couples are using ova or sperm from donors because their own is not “good enough”. He certainly does not discuss how many people make use of genetic testing – or why some people might choose to do so, while others do not. In the absence of any data, it seems to me that it is equally, if not more, likely that most couples will continue to produce children in the old-fashioned way, that being easier, cheaper, and usually leading to a perfectly acceptable, if not perfect, baby.

Although there is no doubt that techniques such as sex selection and pre-natal diagnosis for conditions such as Down Syndrome are in use, I do not think that Beck has made the case that they will necessarily lead to more and more deliberate shaping and manipulation of the human species. It is a possibility that should be examined – and in my opinion, applied very cautiously if at all – but Beck has given me no reason to accept that his concerns are valid.

Beck goes on to suggest that the burden of proof of harm has been misplaced, in that scientific researchers are free to explore questions that may impact all of society, while society as a whole, which will have to bear the risks and consequences of that research, does not have the opportunity to question or influence the direction and methodology of the scientific establishment. It’s the precautionary principle, and as an environmental studies geek, I’m sympathetic to the argument. However, though I agree that all scientific research occurs within a social context and certainly effects society, I think that Beck’s argument is undermined by the fact that he complains that we are moving toward an unknown future without stopping to ask what the consequences of our decisions will be, and yet he does not take the opportunity to present data that presumably are already available, if his assertions about the use of reproductive technology are credible.

Perhaps that’s a different book, one devoted to exploring the current and future consequences of scientific research. Nonetheless, I find it hard to accept an argument that there will be fundamental changes to society as a result of applied research without some tangible reasons why. “People will use it because it’s available” or “the medical-economic establishment will market it” is not enough. I think that the precautionary principle should guide research and innovation, but I also think that those of us who advocate it need to use, and encourage everyone to use, existing data to good effect.

I haven’t been writing here much (okay, at all) because – as noted in March – I’ve been concentrating on the writing that somebody else is expected to read and then assign me a letter to indicate the quality of my work. Writing, I believe, is one of those things that one gets out of practice in; so is reading books with a bit more meat to them than, say, Honor Harrington novels. Besides, I’d rather write the literature review for my thesis in the next three months, when I don’t have to do anything else. So, the summer project for Sammy’s Dot will be an ongoing series of reflection on a self-directed reading program.

I just finished Michael Mayerfield Bell’s An Invitation to Environmental Sociology, Andrew Dobson’s Green Political Thought, and Desfor and Keil’s Nature and the City. I’ve still got The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy (Neil Carter) and Mario Diani’s Green Networks to go. Up next, there’s a number of topics I want to explore in more detail.

Environment and Philosophy

Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Paul Taylor)

Environmental Philosophy (R. Elliot and A. Gare)

Food and Food Politics

Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health (Marion Nestle)

Development and Economics

Development as Freedom (Amartya Sen)

Inequality Reexamined (Amartya Sen)

Managing Without Growth (Peter Victor)

Political Science/Political Philosophy

A Theory of Justice (John Rawls)

Political Liberalism (John Rawls)

Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (Ulrich Beck)

Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (Ulrich Beck)

The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order (Ulrich Beck)

World Risk Society (Ulrich Beck)

Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy (Bruno Latour)

Environmental Citizenship (Andrew Dobson and David Bell)

Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach (Robyn Eckersley)

Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge (Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley)

Environmental Justice

Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Robert Bullard)

Sustainable Communities and the Challenge of Environmental Justice (J. Agyeman)

The Environmentalism of the Poor: A study of ecological conflicts and valuation (J. Martinez-Alier)

Staying Alive (Vandana Shiva)

Social Movements

Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (R. Dalton and M. Kuechler)

Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach (R. Eyerman and A. Jamison)

Studying Collective Action (M. Diani and R. Eyerman)

Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (A. Morris and C. Muller)

Organizing Dissent: Contemporary Social Movements in Theory and Practice (William Carroll)

Geography and Urban Studies

Justice, Nature, and the Geography of Difference (David Harvey)

Special Places: The Changing Ecosystems of the Toronto Region (B. Roots, D. Chant, C. Heidenreich)

I’m pretty sure that this list will be getting longer, and I think thatI’ll really have to make a separate page to keep track of everything, but the plan, obviously, is to do some serious educatin’ this summer.

The issue that immediately sprang to the forefront of my mind when thinking about a possible thesis topic – admittedly, when challenged by the professor in the first session of the preparatory course at 8:30 in the morning – was to examine what, if any, impact on environmental attitudes and behaviours results from participation in social networks. I’d been thinking about this in the context of Facebook apps like the “lil green patch” people keep inviting me to, which purportedly saves some rainforest every time I send ten people a virtual plant. On the one hand, I believe that the net benefit of this app for the rainforest is nil, but on the other hand, could the act of sending the application invitations to friends raise enough environmental awareness to change behaviour? For example, does it lead to more recycling, or more careful use of one’s municipal composting service, or choosing to forgo buying something? If this app doesn’t do that (and I’m guessing the answer to that is indeed that it doesn’t), could others, and what would they involve?

How about participation in a challenge program like OneMillionActsOfGreen? While this isn’t what I’d call social networking in the sense of Facebook (and it involves traditional media as well as the internet), it does entail making an explicit statement about the kind of person one is, and a commitment to do something specific. Who takes up the challenge, and why? Do they follow through with it? Does that have an impact on their future behaviours? Why? (Do the kinds of behaviours that change as a result of participation have a significant impact on the wellbeing of the Earth?)

Similar kinds of questions are certainly looked at by psychologists, who’ve found that our beliefs about ourselves and the kinds of people we are, and our values, do influence our behaviour. Provided that the behaviour is relatively easy – for example, putting something in the recycling bin instead of the trash – the more I think of myself as a person who is concerned about the state of the Earth, the more likely I am to do it. If the behaviour is relatively difficult or costly – for example, choosing to take public transit instead of driving (assuming for the purpose that I live somewhere far from Toronto’s downtown), the relationship between attitude and behaviour is not as powerful. However, I would likely experience cognitive dissonance if I were to think about my choice to drive instead of take public transit, because my behaviour would be in conflict with my beliefs.

However, I’m not studying psychology these days; although I want to look at how social networking affects the behaviours of individuals, I’m more interested in what kinds of activity can actually change behaviour, and I want to look at what makes them effective. Is it the act of making a public commitment, or the sense that if so many people are participating, it must be a good thing to do? How much do social networking technologies promote participation in new social movements and why and how? Do people go from sending lil green patches to joining Greenpeace to voting Green (and will there be a subset chaining themselves to trees?)?

I think these may be the questions that I really need to focus on, because I want to explore the intersection of online social networking tools with environmental attitudes and behaviour, and the potential political consequences. Next up: how the hell do I operationalize that?

Their paper on the results of the Second National Risk and Culture Study, publicly available (in PDF format) from The Social Science Research Network, reviews several areas of public policy in which people’s willingness to accept seemingly objective facts turned out to be strongly associated with their cultural orientation.

As I noted at the beginning, measures of cultural orientation are widely used in psychology now, and there is a great deal of experimental evidence to support their use. In these studies, generally survey types, the investigators used two scales: individualism and communitarianism, and egalitarianism and hierarchism. Although it is not discussed in this paper, in my (limited) experience with this type of research, participants answer a range of standardized questions to determine where they fit on these axes. (It would have been useful if the researchers had included information on which measures they used, but they do provide a reference in the appendix.)

So, on to the meat of the study: Kahan et al. looked at a number of areas in which perception of risk was dependent on cultural orientation, including gun control, mandatory HPV vaccination, nanotechnology, and global warming. I learned about this study while listening to a podcast on the possible geopolitical effects of climate change, and given my interests, this was the section that really got me excited (though it’s all fascinating).

The investigators had their participants read a newspaper article discussing climate change, but the article came in two versions. In both, the article presented the same facts in the same way: climate change is occuring due to human use of fossil fuels, and will lead to serious consequences for human life it is not reversed. However, while in one, the “scientist’s” report stated that stronger anti-pollution regulations were needed to reduce fossil fuel emissions, while in the other, the recommendation was for further deregulation of, and private investment in, the nuclear industry.

The results were marked: the participants identitified as individualists and hierarchs were significantly more likely to accept the facts presented about climate change, and the implied degree of risk, if they read the pro-nuclear rather than the anti-pollution article – and if they read the anti-pollution article, they actually rated the risk of climate change as less than than if they had read no article at all. On the other hand, though the effect was less, the communitarians and egalitarians actually rated the risk from climate change as lower if they read the pro-nuclear article.The regression analysis suggests that where people fall on these scales explains far more of the variance in answers than do factors such as education and age.

If I’d been running this study, I would have liked to include a second control group in addition to the “no-article” group: I’d include a third article which presented findings about climate change, but did not make any policy recommendations. In this study, participants were either given information plus recommendations that may or may not have been in accord with their cultural orientation, or they were given no information at all. While I would hope that everybody has some idea of what climate change is and what it entails, I wouldn’t assume it’s true, and I think that this might have made a difference in the results.

However, the study still suggests that for those of us who want to develop policies that respond to climate change, it’s going to be a hard slog if facts are shut out based on cultural biases. I’ve already suggested that I think education without policy recommendations might help to get people thinking about climate change risks without setting off the cultural polarization effect described by Kahan et al. (That might come down to another one of my major hobby horses: decent science education. Mandatory. For everyone. All through high school. With required summer sessions for science teachers to update their knowledge. What’s with this crap where two high school general level science courses is all you need?) In addition, I think that policy-makers need to be willing to accept a broad range of options for dealing with climate change. I personally think that regulation and pricing are both going to be needed, but I also believe in robust democracy, and I think that as much as possible, individuals should be empowered to make their own decisions about their lives. There has be a happy medium between those two points.

And, as Kahan et al. note, depending on how the issues are presented, it’s possible to head off the polarizing reactions, and that lets people make decisions a little more objectively. That’s something that’s tough, but possible – and those of us who do accept that climate change is a fact that requires action now  are going to have to remember it when we try to be persuasive.

Kahan, D. M et al. (working paper). The Second National Risk and Culture Study: Making Sense of – and Progress In – The American Culture War of Fact.

The article outlines the case of Ed Abney, who is suffering from Parkinson’s – along with 27 co-workers, all of whom were exposed to trichloroethelyne, which has now been linked to neurological damage similar to that seen in Parkinson’s. However, the conclusive link has only been demonstrated in rats, and it is not possible for researchers to reconstruct a history of Mr. Abney’s exposure to trichloroethelyne and possibly other chemicals over several decades of work.

I think that to most people, looking at the situation, it is obvious that Mr. Abney’s illness was caused by his documented exposure to trichlorothelyne. The clear evidence that it causes Parkinson’s-like symptoms in rats, plus the number of similarly exposed co-workers with similiar symptoms, suggests that trichloroethelyne is a dangerous substance. Mr. Abney and his co-workers should be compensated for the injuries that they suffered on the job, and use of the chemical should be eliminated wherever possible, and strictly controlled if it is too essential in some industries to eliminate immediately.

However, if you’re a scientist – and I have nothing against scientists or the scientific method – it’s not so clear that trichloroethelyne is causing Parkinson’s in humans, especially in humans who have probably been exposed to an entire cocktail of chemicals over many years. The study described in the linked article was a small one, and though the correlation is clear, it’s not unequivocal evidence of causation. It’s probable, but it’s not possible to say for sure.

If you’re a lawyer, particularly a lawyer for the companies that manufacture and use these chemicals, well, perfect: the scientists can’t say that exposure to this chemical definitely caused these symptoms, and in both Canada and the US, most laws follow the principle that a substance is safe until it is proven to be harmful, which is a difficult task.

In the meantime, workers will continue to be exposed to chemicals that are almost certainly harmful, either by themselves or in combination. Air, water, and soil will continue to be polluted with substances that are likely harmful, but not absolutely proven to be so, and humans, animals, and plants far from the industries in question will also be exposed.

Scientific standards are vital, but when it comes to making environmental and workplace policy, the precautionary principle should apply if there is evidence that correlates a substance with harm. That approach can always be reversed at a later date if future research findings do not bear out the correlation, but it is much, much harder to do a reversal if we continue to use chemicals that are probable, but not proven, toxins until the proof rolls in. We are running a very large and uncontrolled experiment on our entire population, and we cannot go back to the way things were if the results turn out not to our liking.

Better safe than sorry, as some like to say.

I suspect – or at least, I hope – that most of the people advocating for greater conservation in Canada are also wrestling with guilt, because setting aside land is not as simple as it sounds on paper.

Economic impact is an important problem, of course, especially in Canada, where there are still many towns based around a single industry, usually an extractive one. However, the questions about who can access designated parks, and what kinds of activity can be permitted in designated parks (leaving aside logging and mining, both of which are permitted in parks across this country), strikes me as more pernicious, because they are more forgettable. Nonetheless, the way we as a society answer those questions can have a major impact on how much land is protected, and where that land is, and how effective the protection is.

For example, I currently have access to a car, and the financial means to go camping a few times a year; it’s easy for me to visit Ontario’s parks (assuming my designated driver feels like roughing it for a bit, at least). I’m all for designating more lands strictly as parks, with restricted access for camping and hiking and no extractive industry. But I’m lucky, and it’s easy for me to forget that it’s a luxury to be able to agitate for more land to be set aside for me to pursue an activity I enjoy. If I didn’t have the financial means to consider leaving town for a weekend, and easy access to transportation, well, I doubt that it would be important to me whether or not there were public parks available.

Part of the answer to this is that we need to encourage people to think about the ecosystems that are around where they live. In this view, the David Dunlop Observatory lands should be understood to be as important as a place like High Park. Spaces that are in the middle of cities are always going to be more significantly impacted by human activity, but they can still serve as habitats and as nodes in a network of wildlife corridors; they can still be places where indigenous ecosystems can be preserved. The only difference between these two parks is that one is an official park and is not under threat, and one is owned by a developer, and the deer and birds do not pay rent.

It’s still important to agitate for strong protection of undeveloped wilderness, but I think that part of the answer to the problem of who is able to enjoy nature is to remember that nature is all around us, if we permit it to be. We need to petition for a policy to encourage large city parks with a range of natural habitats, linked wherever possible by greenbelts.

Sounds like all of his picks may have their problems, although I think I have high hopes for Stephen Chu: anyone else hearing echoes of Science in the Capital? However, despite their problems, their words are at least encouraging. Not only did I hear a clear statement about environmental justice from Lisa Jackson, but Obama himself stated unequivocally that his administration will respect science and act boldly on scientific knowledge. Watch here: Obama’s energy and environment team.

The end results of Obama’s administration might well be disappointing. Words, after all, are worth their weight in gold.

But it sure would be nice if Stephen Harper took a statement like “we understand that the facts demand bold action” as a thrown gauntlet for his own government. Mr. Harper, you criticized Stephane Dion for not being a leader, and it wasn’t entirely inaccurate. But Dion recognized, as the new US administration seems to, that anthropogenic climate change and ecological damage are the major issues of the day. Economic growth is meaningless if there is nothing to grow but money.

Now there’s a chance for you to prove that even if you follow where others lead, you too can recognize the need for bold action and lead within our country, instead of holding us back.

Sachs’ ideas are strongest when they explore ways to reorganize human society to improve living standards. For example, he provides a fairly clear outline of why improved access to health care and strategies to create jobs through infrastructure spending will help to stabilize population growth and improve individual well-being. In a later chapter, Sachs also compares different social insurance models, including the relatively free market North American economies, mixed European economies, and the Scandinavian social welfare states, and concludes that high levels of social spending by states is beneficial. This form of spending, according to Sachs’ evidence, leads to less poverty and inequality compared to the other two systems, and also may lead to greater prosperity; Sachs cites evidence that the social welfare countries actually have much higher levels of innovation and mobilization of new information technologies, and they spend higher portions of their GDP on research and development.

Although many of the ideas and suggestions that Sachs raises concerning social organization and sustainability are not new, they are clearly explained for those of us who are adamantly not economists, and the discussion is fairly nuanced. I appreciate that Sachs spends some time on the fact that the Scandinavian states are ethnically homogenous, and that this impacts the willingness of citizens to invest in their society, so a wholesale adoption of this model by a country like Canada or the US requires major effort to combat racism and other forms of intolerance and discrimination. Sachs’ suggestions for how to do so are extremely vague, but I’ll forgive him for that: it’s really not within the scope of the book.

That said, I find it much harder to accept Sachs’ discussion of the technological responses that can be made to pressing environmental problems. My previous post already outlined one of my main complaints, which is the focus on reducing carbon emissions through improved efficiency and carbon sequestration. In addition, Sachs argues that peak oil is not going to be a serious issue because of the many other varieties of energy available for humans to exploit. Sachs has a PhD and worlds of experience in international development, and I don’t, so perhaps it’s presumptuous of me to challenge his ideas, but I think he’s wrong.

For example, Sachs points to non-conventional fossil fuel sources, such as the Alberta tar sands, but fails to note that oil extraction from some, if not all, of these sources is resource-intensive and ecologically devastating. Extraction from the tar sands has become economically viable because of improved technology, but also because there is less available oil from conventional sources. I think that Sachs feels that technological improvements will allow us to exploit resources such as the tar sands, coal, and nuclear power without risk of environmental damage, but the recent revelations of the impact of the tar sands tailings on local water supplies suggest to me that that’s wishful thinking. After all, the problem of sequestering mine tailings has been discussed in many countries and in many eras. Perhaps it is simply not possible to store a pile of toxic waste in a way that prevents it from leaking away into its surroundings. (See here for some of the recent attempts to improve carbon sequestration; here for the effects of acid from the Alberta oilsands; the impact of oil sands exploitation on birds; a report on leakage from the tailing ponds; and more on the oilsands. On the topic of coal-mining, see this paper on mountain-top removal mining in the US from the Union of Concerned Scientists, and here for some recent and worrisome developments.)

What about solar, wind, and geothermal? I firmly believe that all of these will be major energy sources in the future, and require substantial public and private investment. (They also tap a social issue, at least in the developed world where we have the luxury of worrying about the impact of wind generators on the view from our houses. This will require some public relations effort from those of us who feel that wind power is essential and that wind generators have their own kind of beauty.) However, all of these sources are a long way from general deployment, and though I think we can improve our technology relatively quickly, it does take time to build the infrastructure. It will also take us time to decide on the best ways to proceed with alternative energy, if we want to avoid potential tragedies of unintended consequences.

Sachs assumes, in other words, that at least in the developed world, we will never again be faced with an energy shortage and all the consequences that would entail – including, I strongly suspect, a food shortage. Thus, even if we need to shift our energy sources and improve efficiency, there is no need to change our consumption patterns. I think that assumption is, at best, unwarranted by the evidence.

Common Wealth is, I think, a useful primer on some of the things that make some human societies unsustainable, and discusses some of the things that those of us in the developed world can support to improve well-being in the (so-called) developing world. It offers some solutions to environmental justice issues, though it does not address causes such as racism, gender inequality, and poverty to any great extent. However, the book is marred by the lack of consideration of the lifestyle of the developed world and whether or not this lifestyle can in fact be sustainable at all. The focus on technical solutions to what may be a social problem is a serious flaw in an otherwise interesting book.