Some final thoughts on Beck, science, and ecological risk.

August 25th, 2009

Having (finally) slogged through both Risk Society and Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, I think I’ve settled my thoughts about Ulrich Beck and his contribution to the contemporary environmental movement.

His point, that modernization leads to increased risks as a consequence of modern activity, and that those risks spur ever more attempts to fix the problems through technology, makes sense. One issue I take with Beck’s notion of “risk society” is that he attempts to argue that social problems and upheaval will result from “reflexive modernization”. I don’t find his case that there will be significant societal consequences arising from genetic engineering convincing, due to the lack of data discussed in my previous post on the books.

However, Beck’s belief that the lack of clear responsibility for any harm that may be caused by emitters of chemical and radioactive pollution will allow the world as a whole to become a laboratory for the potential environmental consequences seems to me to be more persuasive. As I understand him, though, Beck is arguing that the scientific, naturalistic worldview has become too powerful and too closely linked with capitalist interests. This means that no matter what problems are caused by the (presumably commercial) application of scientific research, science and industry will be able to profit by the damage they create and society as a whole will pay the price. Naomi Klein makes a very similar point in The Shock Doctrine, writing about the defense and security industries and the degree of political influence their leaders have gained. It is here that I think Beck is slightly off-base in his criticisms of the scientific worldview.

It seems to me that Beck is correct that the application of science has led to significant environmental damage, but I disagree that this is a new phenomenon, and the scientific method, unlike earlier explorations into new technology, as Beck himself argues, gives us the ability to examine our past harms and also to extrapolate our future. What we need is greater understanding of the scientific method among a much wider segment of the population, in order to effectively direct science. Beck criticizes the ultra-specialization of the practice of science and its elitist character, but as I understand him, he then argues that to prevent widespread social and environmental damage by these scientific elites, the practice of science itself should be socially limited without much regard for the actual evidence that certain directions for research are inherently risky.

That would limit potential harm, but it would also deprive us of many potential benefits. Of course, as I read Beck, he does not believe that scientific knowledge has led to social and individual benefits. I do accept that we benefit from science, in many ways beyond the wonder of understanding. I’d rather see that understanding expanded across the population, and have as many people as possible be capable of realistic evaluation of the risks posed by scientific research and its applications. Beck and I agree that science can cause problems, but I see the fact that science also contains the tools to fix problems as its great strength, not a reason for mistrust.

In which I question the precautionary principle: Ulrich Beck and eugenics

August 19th, 2009

In addition to Risk Society (Ulrich Beck), I’m working on Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk (also by Beck). Both books leave me with the same complaint: give me data!

While Ecological Politics is much more accessible than Risk Society, I think it shows the same method of speculation about the social effects of technology without supporting information. In the first chapter, Beck explores the potential of reproductive technology to fundamentally alter the way humans are born. He is particularly concerned with the way that human embryos (may) become a sort of commodity for researchers, and the results of their research leads to greater and greater levels of medical and scientific intervention into the production of children, and presumably this feeds back into the need to do more genetic research in order to feed this new market.

It’s interesting speculation, but all that it is, is speculation. Beck says that in vitro fertilization is indicated more and more frequently (now that it is possible), but does not offer any statistical information on how many couples are using it (or why!), or how many men are depositing sperm at sperm banks, or how many couples are using ova or sperm from donors because their own is not “good enough”. He certainly does not discuss how many people make use of genetic testing – or why some people might choose to do so, while others do not. In the absence of any data, it seems to me that it is equally, if not more, likely that most couples will continue to produce children in the old-fashioned way, that being easier, cheaper, and usually leading to a perfectly acceptable, if not perfect, baby.

Although there is no doubt that techniques such as sex selection and pre-natal diagnosis for conditions such as Down Syndrome are in use, I do not think that Beck has made the case that they will necessarily lead to more and more deliberate shaping and manipulation of the human species. It is a possibility that should be examined – and in my opinion, applied very cautiously if at all – but Beck has given me no reason to accept that his concerns are valid.

Beck goes on to suggest that the burden of proof of harm has been misplaced, in that scientific researchers are free to explore questions that may impact all of society, while society as a whole, which will have to bear the risks and consequences of that research, does not have the opportunity to question or influence the direction and methodology of the scientific establishment. It’s the precautionary principle, and as an environmental studies geek, I’m sympathetic to the argument. However, though I agree that all scientific research occurs within a social context and certainly effects society, I think that Beck’s argument is undermined by the fact that he complains that we are moving toward an unknown future without stopping to ask what the consequences of our decisions will be, and yet he does not take the opportunity to present data that presumably are already available, if his assertions about the use of reproductive technology are credible.

Perhaps that’s a different book, one devoted to exploring the current and future consequences of scientific research. Nonetheless, I find it hard to accept an argument that there will be fundamental changes to society as a result of applied research without some tangible reasons why. “People will use it because it’s available” or “the medical-economic establishment will market it” is not enough. I think that the precautionary principle should guide research and innovation, but I also think that those of us who advocate it need to use, and encourage everyone to use, existing data to good effect.